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Combing the Underworld

Name: Combing the Underworld
Brand: Biblioscholar
SKU: 9781249911418
Price: 6150 HUF
Availability: InStock

Identification of South East Asian Non-State Actor Proliferation Networks, Nodes, and Chokepoints

Szerző: Adrian A Donahoe

Nyelv:

Kötés: Puha kötésű

Kiadó: Biblioscholar

Elérhetőség: Beszállítói készleten

Küldés 9-15 napon belül

6 150 Ft

The US military, as with all US government agencies, shares the responsibility for countering prolif...

Információk a könyvről

Szerző

Adrian A Donahoe

Nyelv

Angol

Kötés

Könyv - Puha kötésű

Kiadva

2012

oldal

EAN

9781249911418

ISBN

9781249911418

Enbook ID

08144979

Kiadó

Biblioscholar

Súly

141

Méretek

189 x 246 x 4

Teljes leírás

The US military, as with all US government agencies, shares the responsibility for countering proliferation efforts. Although we have identified the types of threat we face, the systems through which it operates are somewhat more difficult to identify. Each region of the world, and indeed, each country have its own peculiarities. This paper asks the question, "How can we be prepared to identify potential proliferation networks and chokepoints in South East Asia?" This paper proposes that a potential solution may be the development of a common template that we can use as a starting point for identification of networks, chokepoints, and nodes. This template begins by looking at the interactions within a single country and expands to a geographical region, then ties in other regions to encompass the globe. This paper focuses on South East Asia, and will use examples from a single country for the sample template. Why should we use South East Asia for the development of our template? South East Asia has long been a hub for illicit commerce, smuggling, piracy, and corruption. Many of the networks for drug, money, arms, and human trafficking intersect and often overlay one another within this region. Although many analysts believe that a connection between criminal elements and proliferators does not currently exist, this does not negate the necessity for identification of potential networking. The lack of hard evidence or the belief that criminal elements currently do not see the relative value in assisting proliferators or terrorists attempting to gain access to WMD may be an indicator that we have not looked closely enough at their possible linkages. As organizations and individuals attempt to market available WMD, it is likely that they will attempt to operate networks within countries and regions with pre-existing markets and routes for other illicit trade. Rather than create an entirely new system that counter proliferators would easily identify, it would be simpler