This book examines the transformation of the United States Army between 1946 and 1960 as it shifted its approach to warfare from massive mobilization to deterrence based on forces-in-being. In particular it examines methods used to develop managerial characteristics and skills in its officer corps. Throughout the latter part of the 1940 s the U.S. Army struggled to comprehend and adapt to a changing environment. Ultimately the creation of large, peacetime, forces-in-being resulted in a need for the Army to change not only its approach to warfighting but also its methods of training its managerial cadre-the officer corps. This book traces the changes the Army experienced prior to the Second World War and ties those changes to the Army s post World War II transformation. Also, the legislative underpinnings of the Department of Defense and the key geo-political events of the time are examined and placed into an evolutionary flow. This book will appeal to those with a passing interest in the early years of post-World War II American history, global geo-politics, and the U.S. military as well as those conducting scholarly research in any of these areas.