Angol
This monograph analyzes the interrelationship between new way the US forces will fight their wars in future 13 effects based operations (EBO) with network centered forces (NCO) 13 and the challenges after the major combat operations (MCO) ended, known as post conflict operations, reconstruction phase, or phase IV. The focus is on the prerequisite for phase IV, to get the acceptance of the population for an new start. The history suggests that only total defeat prepares the population for an new start. First, the monograph reviews the background of defeat. Herby lies the main emphasis on the situation and the will of the civilian population. Then the monograph examines the acceptance of defeat in two historical examples in detail. Japan and Germany. Some more recent examples, Dominican Republic (1965), Haiti (1994), and Kosovo (1999), are shortly considered too. The results of those examinations show that bombing did not lead to total defeat and is therefore not the necessary start point for phase IV. Second, the monograph describes the new kind of warfare. It explains the different kind of effects and analyses the interrelationship between those kinds of effects. The developments of NCO and EBO are described. The use of the new technology during the Operation Iraqi Freedom is assessed and investigated for the consequences for phase IV operations. Finally, the lessons learned out of history about the acceptance of defeat and the starting point for phase IV operations are mirrored against the ideas of EBO and NCO. The start of phase IV in the historical examples show that not the total defeat is responsible for the success within phase IV, but effects which are within EBO could be used even better to prepare during MCO for a great success of phase IV.
